Remigration: Europe’s Far Right Pushes a Radical Concept
On May 30, 2026, far-right figures from across Europe will gather in Porto, Portugal, for the second European Remigration Summit — RESUM26. The gathering follows a series of demonstrations and meetings that have brought the concept of “remigration” from the fringes of political discourse into increasingly mainstream conversation. But what exactly is remigration, and why are far-right movements in Flanders and beyond so determined to normalize it?
What Is Remigration?
At its core, remigration is a far-right concept advocating for the mass deportation of non-white immigrants — including naturalized citizens and their descendants — to countries of their presumed racial ancestry. Scholars describe it as a euphemism for ethnic cleansing. Proponents, however, insist it is a neutral policy term.
Tom Van Grieken, president of the far-right Flemish party Vlaams Belang, defined it during a March 2026 interview as “the return of illegals, criminal foreigners, people here only for our social security, and Muslim extremists who incite violence.” But experts argue the term is deliberately vague.
François Debras, a professor at the University of Liège specializing in far-right discourse, warns that “remigration is a malleable term whose purpose is to lock down the debate.” Benjamin Biard, a researcher at the Belgian political research center CRISP, is blunter: “It’s not at all neutral. It’s a term very much connoted with the far right.”
Flanders at the Forefront
Flanders has emerged as a key battleground in the push to normalize remigration. On March 26, 2026, the far-right Flemish student club NSV (Nationalistische Studentenvereniging) organized a “Remigration March” in Leuven, drawing hundreds of participants and significant anti-fascist counter-protests. Van Grieken attended the march, publicly defending remigration as a “neutral term.”
Dries Van Langenhove, founder of the identitarian group Schild & Vrienden and a convicted figure in Belgian courts, is a featured speaker at the Porto summit. Van Langenhove received a suspended one-year prison sentence and a 1,600 euro fine in 2025 for his group’s activities. His presence at the summit underscores the transnational nature of the movement.
Vlaams Belang, which polls around 20-25% in Flanders, has called for remigration policies since 2011 and proposed the creation of an “Agency for Remigration” in 2021. The party’s influence has helped push the concept into mainstream political discourse in Belgium.
A Pan-European Movement
The push for remigration is far from a purely Flemish phenomenon. In late April 2026, a far-right meeting in Milan, Italy drew several thousand participants advocating for remigration. Matteo Salvini, leader of Italy’s Lega party, called for remigration at the rally, suggesting a “points-based residence permit” system.
The Porto summit represents the culmination of this coordinated European strategy. Organizers describe three categories of people who could be targeted: illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, legal immigrants, and “non-assimilated” naturalized citizens. As InfoMigrants reported, the first Remigration Summit in May 2025 drew roughly 400 activists from across Europe.
Benjamin Biard describes this as “a far-right galaxy that knows no borders,” noting that movements like Schild & Vrienden modeled themselves on France’s Generation Identity, which itself drew inspiration from the Austrian identitarian movement IBÖ.
The Overton Window Strategy
Experts see the remigration campaign as a calculated effort to shift the boundaries of acceptable political discourse — a classic Overton window strategy.
Debras explains the mechanism: “In Germany, the AfD believes that second and third-generation migrants can be sent back. It’s easy for other parties to say they don’t go that far and that they ‘only’ want to send back criminals.” By staking out an extreme position, far-right parties make previously radical proposals appear moderate by comparison.
This strategy extends to language itself. Biard notes that the goal is “to impose its vocabulary, but also the ideas it contains, figuring that once this battle is won, only the political victory remains.” Van Langenhove has openly described his approach as “metapolitics” — the idea of winning cultural hegemony before seeking political power.
From Biological to Cultural Racism
The concept of remigration has deep historical roots. It traces back to Nazi Germany’s Madagascar Plan of the late 1930s, which proposed deporting Europe’s Jewish population to the island of Madagascar. The modern iteration gained traction through Renaud Camus’ 2011 book “Le Grand Remplacement” (The Great Replacement), which promoted the conspiracy theory that white European populations are being deliberately replaced through immigration.
According to Debras, the shift from overt biological racism to cultural and religious racism in the 1980s and 1990s created a need for new terminology. “Remigration” fills this gap — carrying implicit racist connotations while maintaining a veneer of technical neutrality. As Debras puts it, the term is “malleable” enough to mean different things to different audiences, allowing far-right leaders to appeal to both hardcore supporters and mainstream voters.
What to Watch For
The Porto summit this weekend will test whether the movement can sustain its momentum. Key questions remain: Will remigration normalization translate into electoral gains for far-right parties? Will center-right parties adopt remigration-adjacent language? And how will anti-fascist movements and governments respond?
What is clear is that remigration is no longer a fringe concept. Through coordinated action, strategic language, and the exploitation of democratic norms, Europe’s far right is working to make the unthinkable thinkable — one summit, one march, and one word at a time.