China Halts Ammo Exports to FN Herstal, Triggering Crisis

Belgian arms manufacturer FN Herstal is confronting a critical supply chain disruption after China halted exports of nitrocellulose — a compound known as “shooting cotton” that is essential for ammunition propellants. The move, reported by De Morgen, threatens production at one of NATO’s most important small arms suppliers and exposes a strategic vulnerability in European defense manufacturing.

Context: What Is at Stake

Nitrocellulose, also known as cellulose nitrate or “shooting cotton,” is a highly flammable compound produced by treating cellulose with nitric acid. It is a critical component in military propellants for bullets and artillery shells, as well as in smokeless gunpowder formulations. Beyond defense, it is also used in industrial applications including lacquers, inks, and coatings. China is the world’s dominant producer, controlling a significant portion of global supply — a dependency that European and American ammunition manufacturers have long relied upon without developing sufficient domestic alternatives.

FN Herstal, founded in 1889 in the Belgian city of Herstal near Liège, is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of military small arms. Its product lineup includes the FN SCAR, FN P90, FN MINIMI (M249 SAW), and FN MAG — weapons used extensively by NATO forces, including the United States military. As of 2012, the company was the largest exporter of military small arms in Europe. The FN Browning Group, its parent company, also includes FN UK and FN America, giving it a transatlantic manufacturing footprint.

The Supply Disruption

The export halt is not an isolated incident but part of a broader escalation. On April 24, 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce added seven EU entities to its export control list, including FN Herstal and its parent company FN Browning (Belgium), Hensoldt AG (Germany), and four Czech entities. The Brussels Times confirmed that the sanctions were imposed in retaliation for arms sales to Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway province.

According to De Morgen’s reporting, the nitrocellulose export halt “is not merely symbolic” — it represents a serious operational threat to FN Herstal’s ammunition production lines. The development follows China’s earlier restrictions on nitrocellulose exports beginning in September 2024, which had already affected U.S. ammunition manufacturers.

Broader Implications for NATO and European Defense

The crisis highlights a critical vulnerability in NATO’s supply chain. Europe has been rapidly increasing defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and FN Herstal has been a key beneficiary of increased orders for small arms and ammunition. However, the company’s — and by extension NATO’s — dependence on Chinese raw materials for ammunition production undermines European strategic autonomy at a time when the continent is seeking to bolster its defense industrial base.

The Dutch government has already identified nitrocellulose production as a strategic vulnerability. In a May 2026 document titled “Kabinetsaanpak chemie en materialen voor Defensie,” the Netherlands noted that Europe has little domestic production capacity and remains heavily dependent on Chinese imports. This crisis is likely to accelerate calls for European investment in domestic nitrocellulose manufacturing — a process that would require significant time, capital, and technological expertise to establish.

A 2022 incident further illustrates the complex supply chain challenges facing FN Herstal. The United Kingdom blocked a €300-600 million order of machine guns from the Belgian manufacturer due to Belgian export restrictions on a high-pressure press, demonstrating that defense supply chain vulnerabilities exist on multiple fronts — not just raw materials but also manufacturing equipment.

Geopolitical Dimensions

China’s actions appear driven by multiple factors beyond the immediate Taiwan dispute. By targeting a critical input where it holds near-monopoly control, Beijing demonstrates its ability to disrupt Western defense supply chains with surgical precision. The sanctions also coincide with increased NATO presence in the Asia-Pacific region, suggesting a deliberate linkage between European security posture toward China and Chinese economic retaliation.

This is part of a broader pattern of China using export controls as a geopolitical tool. The September 2024 restrictions on nitrocellulose exports that first affected U.S. ammunition manufacturers signaled Beijing’s willingness to weaponize its dominance in critical materials. The escalation against European defense companies in April 2026 extends this strategy to NATO allies directly.

EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius was scheduled to visit FN Herstal and Thales Belgium on June 5, 2026, but was forced to cancel due to security concerns from pro-Palestinian protests — underscoring the tense geopolitical environment surrounding Belgian defense companies. The cancelled visit came just as the nitrocellulose crisis was breaking, depriving the company of high-level EU engagement at a critical moment.

What’s Next

The exact scale of FN Herstal’s nitrocellulose inventory and how long production can continue without Chinese supplies remains unclear. No alternative suppliers have been publicly identified, and it is uncertain whether producers in India, Brazil, or within Europe can fill the gap quickly enough to prevent production disruptions. FN Herstal has not issued an official public statement about the supply disruption, leaving questions about contingency plans unanswered.

Several key questions remain: Will the Belgian government intervene to support its strategic defense manufacturer? Can European production of nitrocellulose be ramped up in time? How will this affect NATO ammunition supplies for ongoing operations, including support for Ukraine? And will other European ammunition manufacturers face similar supply disruptions as China expands its use of export controls?

This story is likely to develop further as European governments and NATO assess the implications and seek alternative supply arrangements. The crisis serves as a stark reminder that in modern geopolitical competition, control over critical raw materials can be as strategically significant as military capability itself — and that Europe’s defense ambitions may be constrained by dependencies it has yet to address.