Why the US Keeps Losing Wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran

The United States has been at war for more than 20 of the past 25 years, fighting three major conflicts in the same region of the Middle East. In each case, American forces achieved swift initial victories — ousting the Taliban from Afghanistan in weeks, toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq in weeks, and killing Iran’s Supreme Leader on the first day of the 2026 war. Yet in none of these conflicts did overwhelming military might translate into lasting political success. The Taliban now runs Afghanistan. Iraq achieved only partial stability after a brutal, years-long insurgency. And Iran’s theocratic regime remains firmly in place, the war grinding on with no resolution in sight.

This paradox — a superpower that can shatter any enemy but cannot secure a durable victory — is the subject of a penetrating analysis by NPR’s Greg Myre, published as the Iran war enters a dangerous new phase. Drawing on interviews with leading national security experts, the piece identifies a recurring pattern of strategic failure that has persisted across Republican and Democratic administrations alike.

The Pattern: Breaking Things, Then Stumbling

“We generally do a pretty good job of the breaking things and killing people at the inception of the wars,” said Peter Bergen, a national security analyst at CNN and author of the new book All The Presidents’ Wars. “We, the United States, tend to not plan for the day after — the peace that follows the war.”

This failure to plan for post-war stabilization is the first of several interconnected problems that have plagued American military interventions. According to Paul Salem, a Middle East analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies based in Lebanon, the U.S. has “an imperial appetite, but a tourist’s approach to it.” Salem noted that the countries the U.S. has sought to remake “have a recent history not of stability and deep institutions that you can just come in and change somebody at the top and everything works out.”

The pattern holds across three administrations. Under President George W. Bush, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 with minimal post-war planning, leading to prolonged insurgencies. Under President Barack Obama, a “surge” in Afghanistan failed to deliver a decisive outcome. And under President Donald Trump — who campaigned on ending “forever wars” — the U.S. launched the largest military conflict since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2026 Iran war.

Maximalist Goals, Limited Means

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, who served as the “war czar” coordinating efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan under presidents Bush and Obama, identified a fundamental disconnect at the heart of U.S. strategy.

“We’ve had repeated disconnects between ends, ways, and means,” Lute told NPR. “We’ve had a lack of sufficient understanding of what we were getting into.”

Lute, who also served as U.S. ambassador to NATO, was particularly critical of the current Iran war strategy. “When we launch only a bombing campaign but we retain maximalist goals, like regime change, you don’t have any prospect for success unless you’re just lucky,” he said. “And being lucky is not the place to start a military campaign.”

The U.S. has sought regime change in Iran while deliberately avoiding a ground invasion — a strategy that analysts say is fundamentally contradictory. At various times, Trump has called for eliminating Iran’s nuclear program, toppling the government, and destroying its air force, navy, and missile capabilities, all while keeping U.S. troops out of harm’s way.

The Rise of Asymmetric Warfare

Harvard professor Stephen Walt, a leading international relations theorist, argues that the technological superiority of the U.S. military has been systematically neutralized by weaker adversaries who adapt to American strengths.

“Those dazzled by the technological wizardry of an F-35 or the ability of the United States, Israel, and a few others to conduct complicated combined arms operations have failed to recognize that warfare has been slowly shifting in favor of local defenders, even when facing seemingly superior foes,” Walt wrote recently in Foreign Policy.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, militants turned to roadside bombs and suicide bombers. In Iran, the military has deployed low-cost drones and effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried 20% of the world’s energy exports before the war — despite the U.S. having decimated Iran’s conventional navy.

The Diplomatic Deficit

A recurring theme across all three conflicts is the subordination of diplomacy to military force. Salem noted that State Department advice has been consistently marginalized.

“Advice from the State Department was kind of brushed aside as too weak and too wimpy,” Salem said. “We’ve seen it again in this [Iran] war. There’s barely any State Department input or advice.”

According to The Guardian, Trump has relied on a small circle of negotiators — Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Vice President JD Vance — rather than seasoned Iran specialists. Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told the Guardian that this lack of expertise has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the adversary.

The 1991 Model: A Forgotten Blueprint

All three analysts point to the 1991 Gulf War under President George H.W. Bush as the last successful U.S. military campaign in the Middle East. The objective was limited — liberate Kuwait, not overthrow Saddam Hussein — and backed by a broad international coalition with a United Nations mandate. The campaign lasted five weeks of bombing followed by a four-day ground war. There was no occupation, no nation-building.

“I count that war as the last time that we really had realistic objectives,” Lute said. “We had admittedly limited objectives — which was to liberate Kuwait. It was not to take on Baghdad, not to overthrow Saddam, not to replace the Iraqi government.”

What Comes Next

The Iran war now stands at a critical juncture. A ceasefire signed at the Palace of Versailles on June 17 collapsed within weeks, and Trump resumed strikes in mid-July. The war has cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated $113.3 billion as of June 2026, according to Wikipedia. Casualties include approximately 3,684 total killed in Iran and 19 U.S. soldiers killed, with thousands more wounded.

Analysts warn of several possible trajectories: a prolonged bombing campaign that fails to achieve regime change, a ground invasion that could lead to a multi-year occupation, or a negotiated settlement that would require the U.S. to accept a nuclear-capable Iran. None of these outcomes are likely to produce the kind of decisive victory that American military planners envision.

Salem offered a sobering assessment of the long-term outlook. Iran, he said, “is able to inflict a cost on the global economy and, indirectly, on the U.S. president. I think there will be future wars and confrontations.”

The fundamental question — whether the era of decisive U.S. military victory has permanently ended — remains unanswered. What is clear is that until the U.S. addresses the structural, strategic, and diplomatic failures that have defined its post-9/11 wars, the pattern of initial triumph followed by prolonged stalemate is likely to repeat itself.