Belgium Charts Rail Liberalization Path for 2033
On July 18, 2026, the Belgian federal government formally approved a roadmap to open the country’s domestic passenger railway market to competition by January 1, 2033 — ending the century-old monopoly of the national operator SNCB/NMBS. The decision, taken by the “Arizona” coalition government, implements the European Union’s Fourth Railway Package, which requires member states to open domestic passenger rail services to competitive tendering.
The Roadmap at a Glance
Rather than a sudden “big bang” liberalization, the government has chosen a phased, staggered approach. Under the plan, service contracts for specific line packages will be awarded through competitive public tenders using a Public Service Obligation (PSO) model. Infrastructure — tracks, signaling, and stations — will remain under the public management of Infrabel, meaning only passenger transport operations will face competition.
According to reporting by RTBF, the government also intends to create an independent transport organizing authority — a new institution tasked with designing the rail service offering and coordinating between operators. Minister of Mobility Jean-Luc Crucke (Les Engagés) has indicated that a more precise timetable will be presented by the end of 2026.
Why Now? The EU Framework
Belgium’s move is driven by the Fourth Railway Package, adopted by the EU in 2016. The legislation builds on three earlier railway packages (2001–2007) that progressively opened rail markets across Europe. It covers harmonized technical standards, workforce certification, independent infrastructure management, and — crucially — the opening of domestic passenger services to competition through competitive tendering for PSO contracts.
Under EU law, member states may qualify for a “direct award” exception in cases of exceptionally complex networks where coordination is particularly difficult. Belgium’s Brussels North-South Junction — the most congested rail tunnel in the world — may provide a legal basis for such an exemption, though the government has not indicated it will pursue this route.
What European Experience Teaches
François-Xavier Lievens, a researcher in law at UCLouvain, analyzed European rail liberalization experiences for RTBF. His findings paint a nuanced picture.
In Germany, regionalization of rail service obligations to the Länder (states) began in the 1990s and is widely considered a reference model — so much so that the EU’s framework is essentially a copy of the German system. France has likewise opened regional train contracts to competition, though most have been retained by SNCF. Italy has introduced competition on high-speed corridors with notable success.
The Netherlands presents a more complicated case: the national operator NS retained profitable major routes while smaller lines were awarded to foreign subsidiaries (Keolis/SNCF and Arriva/DB). The European Commission has initiated proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union against this direct award to NS.
Perhaps the most instructive case is the United Kingdom. As RTBF has documented, the UK’s full privatization in the 1990s — distinct from managed liberalization — is widely considered a failure. “The UK didn’t liberalize, but privatized in the 1990s. It’s a failure,” Lievens said, noting that the country is now in the process of renationalizing its rail network.
Luxembourg offers a contrasting approach: it made all trains free, demonstrating that public policy intent can override market dynamics entirely.
Will Passengers See Lower Fares?
One of the central questions for Belgian commuters is whether competition will lead to cheaper tickets. The evidence, according to Lievens, is not straightforward.
“We cannot say that at the European level, competition leads to lower fares,” he told RTBF. While price reductions are possible on high-speed lines like Brussels-Paris or Brussels-Amsterdam, Belgium has no domestic high-speed TGV network. For local public service routes, there is no correlation between competition and lower prices.
However, Lievens emphasized that governments can set prices through PSO contracts. “If there is an intention to lower fares, by specifying it in the public service contract, then they can be lowered, but that’s not linked to competition,” he explained, citing Luxembourg’s free train policy as an example.
A 2026 study by the French Transport Regulation Authority (ART) cited by Lievens found that “passengers are the first beneficiaries of market opening,” with increased supply, improved service quality, and competitive pressure on prices. But Lievens cautioned that efficiency gains are more likely to translate into better service at constant public cost rather than lower fares.
The Worker Status Debate
Belgian railway workers benefit from a special statutory status that provides protections compensating for the demanding physical nature of the work — shifts can start at 3 AM and end at 1 AM. Management has argued this status must be reformed for competitiveness. But Lievens contends that EU law explicitly allows attaching the worker status to any PSO contract, leveling the playing field without requiring its abolition.
“Regarding working conditions for railway workers, there is a great risk that potential productivity gains linked to competition will be made at their expense rather than on transport organization,” Lievens warned. “A harmonization of social rules between SNCB and its competitors is therefore necessary.”
The left-wing PTB (Workers’ Party) has taken a firm stance against liberalization. MP Farah Jacquet, herself a railway worker of 18 years, argued: “We don’t need competitors for the SNCB, we need a government that invests in the SNCB.” The PTB points to Switzerland and Austria — both with public, integrated rail systems — as Europe’s best-performing networks.
Challenges Ahead: The Brussels Bottleneck
The Brussels North-South Junction, the busiest rail tunnel in the world, already presents daily coordination challenges between SNCB and Infrabel. Adding multiple operators could exacerbate these difficulties. Lievens noted that “coordination costs will increase, and a strong organizing authority is essential.”
What Comes Next
Several critical questions remain unanswered. Will Belgium pursue the EU’s direct award exception? What specific line packages will be created, and over what timeline? Will the worker status be maintained? Which potential competitors — Deutsche Bahn, Arriva, Keolis, or others — are likely to bid?
Minister Crucke is expected to present a more precise timetable by the end of 2026. The road to 2033 will require careful design of contract specifications, robust social protections, and a sufficiently empowered organizing authority. As European experiences demonstrate, the outcome will depend not on whether competition is introduced, but on how it is structured.
For Belgian rail passengers, the coming years will determine whether liberalization delivers the promised improvements — or whether, as the PTB warns, it simply trades a public monopoly for private fragmentation.