Japan Establishes NIA Amid Rights and Surveillance Concerns

Japan’s government has formally decided to establish a National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and convene the first meeting of a new National Intelligence Council (NIC) on July 31, marking the most significant restructuring of the country’s post-World War II intelligence framework in decades. The move, spearheaded by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, has ignited fierce debate over surveillance, democratic oversight, and the trajectory of Japan’s security policy.

A Historic Shift in Intelligence Architecture

The legislation creating the NIC and NIA was approved by the Cabinet on March 13, 2026, passed the Lower House on April 23, and cleared the Upper House on May 27, according to the Asahi Shimbun. On July 24, the government formally decided to move forward with establishing the NIA, with the first NIC session scheduled for July 31.

The new architecture places intelligence authority directly under the prime minister’s office. The NIC will serve as the command center, chaired by Prime Minister Takaichi and comprising 11 Cabinet ministers including the chief cabinet secretary and the foreign and defense ministers. The NIA will function as the operational secretariat, absorbing the existing Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO, known as Naicho) and led by a director at the parliamentary vice minister level — an upgrade from CIRO’s current administrative vice minister-level head.

Crucially, the NIA will be granted “comprehensive coordination authority” to consolidate and analyze information from all government ministries, breaking down the “siloed” structure that has long plagued Japan’s decentralized intelligence system. The council has also been tasked with formulating Japan’s first-ever “National Intelligence Strategy” by the end of 2026.

Fears of a ‘Tokko’ Revival

The centralization of intelligence powers has stirred deep unease in a country still grappling with the legacy of its wartime past. Critics have drawn direct parallels to the “Tokko” (Special Higher Police), the notorious pre-war and wartime secret police that monitored, arrested, and tortured citizens for their political beliefs.

“The core of the bill is the war logic of ‘enemy-friend distinction,’” warned Nishimura Makoto, chair of the Japan Media Culture Information Union Council, in comments reported by People’s Daily. “The government unilaterally defines who the ‘enemy’ is… Media workers will be first targeted — investigative reports exposing scandals could be labeled ‘leaking state secrets.’”

Rasharu Ishii, a Diet member from the Social Democratic Party, was even more blunt, describing the NIA as “an intelligence agency without oversight, ultimately becoming nothing more than the ruling party’s thug.”

Sugihara Koji, a representative of the citizens’ group “Stop Large-Scale Military Expansion,” told protesters that the bill “has no legislative basis, no supporting oversight mechanism, and can’t even clearly define its scope — it’s completely absurd.”

The Oversight Deficit

Perhaps the most pointed criticism concerns the absence of independent oversight. Unlike Western nations where intelligence agencies are subject to parliamentary monitoring, Japan’s new law establishes no independent third-party watchdog. The Global Times noted that the bill “deliberately blurs the boundaries of intelligence gathering, failing to establish red lines for the protection of citizens’ privacy and lacking mechanisms for real-time parliamentary scrutiny and third-party oversight.”

Japanese media have raised similar alarms. The Asahi Shimbun reported that Prime Minister Takaichi has not explicitly denied that ordinary citizens participating in opposition protests could become investigation targets. The Mainichi Shimbun commented that the law “does not include any system to monitor the activities of intelligence agencies.”

Why Japan Says It Needs This

Supporters argue the reforms are long overdue. Japan has frequently been described as a “paradise for spies” due to its weak counterintelligence capabilities. Former Soviet intelligence officers who operated in Japan noted that Soviet intelligence extensively targeted Japanese technologies, industrial information, and U.S. military facilities during the Cold War.

Ken Kotani, a professor at Nihon University, told Al Jazeera that “Japan needs to collect intelligence by herself” as the certainty of the U.S. alliance declines. He noted that Japan’s foreign and national security policy has gradually pursued its own direction, especially during the Trump administration period, which has repeatedly questioned U.S. alliance commitments.

Sanshiro Hosaka, a research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security, offered a more measured perspective. He told Al Jazeera that the reform is “aimed at improving the Japanese government’s intelligence abilities by strengthening coordination, reducing interagency barriers,” and that “the legislation does not itself create significant new intelligence collection or counterintelligence powers.”

Part of a Broader Military Expansion

The intelligence overhaul is not happening in isolation. As The Diplomat noted, this law is part of a long series of reforms dating back to the end of World War II, but it arrives alongside an unprecedented military buildup. In December 2025, Takaichi’s cabinet approved Japan’s largest-ever defense budget at $58 billion. In April 2026, the cabinet moved closer to abolishing the longstanding ban on lethal weapons exports. The government has also proceeded with deploying long-range missiles capable of striking enemy bases — a significant departure from Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented posture.

Critics see these moves as interconnected. Protest organizers in Tokyo have argued that the NIA and potential future legislation — such as a “Foreign Agent Law” and a “Foreign Intelligence Agency” — are all pieces of a “re-militarization” roadmap. “The government is working to turn the defense industry into an economic pillar,” one protest leader said, according to People’s Daily. “While letting prices soar and people’s livelihoods suffer, they are frantically building up arms — this is no different from what Japanese militarists did before World War II.”

Public Opinion and Generational Divide

Despite the vocal protests, public opinion on the reforms is not uniformly opposed. A Jiji opinion poll conducted in April found that only 19 percent of respondents opposed the intelligence reform bill, while approximately 40 percent expressed indifference and the remainder supported it. Kotani noted that younger generations are less concerned about the historical surveillance legacy. “Especially younger generations are not interested in such an old story,” he told Al Jazeera.

What to Watch For

As Japan moves forward with its intelligence centralization, several developments merit close attention. The first NIC meeting on July 31 will set the tone for how the new architecture operates. The council is expected to produce Japan’s first National Intelligence Strategy by year’s end, which will clarify the scope and priorities of the country’s intelligence activities.

Equally significant will be whether the government pursues complementary legislation, including an anti-espionage law and a foreign influence transparency law, which experts like Hosaka have identified as critical missing pieces. The debate over oversight mechanisms is also far from settled — domestic and international pressure may yet force the government to introduce independent monitoring.

For the Asia-Pacific region, Japan’s intelligence centralization represents both an opportunity for enhanced security cooperation and a source of concern about the direction of the country’s defense policy. As the Global Times editorial warned, “any indulgence or appeasement could once again plunge the region into the abyss of conflict and confrontation.” Whether that assessment proves alarmist or prescient will depend on the safeguards — or lack thereof — that accompany Japan’s new intelligence apparatus.