Belgium, China, US Battle Over Congo’s ‘Snail Mountain’
Deep in the copper belt of the Democratic Republic of Congo, a century-old slag heap known locally as the “snail mountain” has become the unlikely center of a geopolitical tug-of-war between Belgium, China, and the United States. At stake is control over germanium, a rare and strategically vital metal essential for fiber optics, semiconductors, defense systems, and space technology.
The Belgian government recently approved a state guarantee of approximately €26.4 million to support Umicore’s germanium purchases from the Congolese company STL (Société pour le Traitement du Terril de Lubumbashi), a subsidiary of state-owned Gécamines. The decision, approved by the Council of Ministers on July 10 and administered through Belgium’s export credit agency Credendo, signals Brussels’ determination to secure access to critical minerals as global competition intensifies, according to De Morgen.
What Is the ‘Snail Mountain’?
The term “snail mountain” is the Flemish translation of “terril,” the word for a slag heap. The Big Hill terril in Lubumbashi contains approximately 10 million metric tons of mining waste accumulated over nearly a century of metallurgical activity. Long dismissed as industrial debris, this massive pile of slag is now recognized as a treasure trove of valuable minerals, including zinc, silver, cobalt, copper, and germanium.
Germanium is classified as a critical raw material for telecommunications, electronics, space technology, defense, and renewable energy. It is essential for fiber optics, solar cells, electronic components, and infrared systems. With one ton of germanium commanding approximately $2.2 million on the market, the stakes are considerable.
A Historic Partnership
The current battle lines were drawn in May 2024, when Umicore and STL signed an exclusive long-term partnership agreement covering germanium recovered from the Big Hill mining waste. The deal marked a significant milestone for the DRC: in October 2024, STL exported its first batch of locally produced germanium concentrates, the first time in Congolese history that a domestic company processed and exported this strategic metal.
Guy Robert Lukama, Chairman of the Board of Gécamines/STL, hailed the achievement: “With the production of germanium at STL, we become an important player in the global production of this strategic metal, which gives the DRC a major geostrategic position in its relations with its partners.”
Grant Dempsey, Director General of STL, described the partnership as mutually beneficial: “The partnership with Umicore is very beneficial for STL, but I also think for Umicore, which on its side discovers other ways of working in a very different environment.”
The DRC is expected to produce about 30 tons of germanium annually, compared to 180 tons from Russia, China, and Mongolia combined. While still a relatively small player, Congo’s entry into the germanium market provides Western nations with an alternative to Chinese-dominated supply chains.
The Geopolitical Chessboard
Belgium’s state guarantee is explicitly designed to prevent China from gaining control of the germanium supply from STL. China has imposed export controls on germanium and gallium in response to US sanctions on Chinese technology companies, making alternative sources strategically important for Western nations.
Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot framed the decision in broader European terms: “Access to critical raw materials has become a strategic challenge for Europe. Countries like the DRC want to diversify their partnerships and Belgium can offer a reliable alternative that benefits both parties.”
Defense and Foreign Trade Minister Theo Francken emphasized the security dimension: “Germanium is essential for technologies on which our security is increasingly dependent, from defense systems to semiconductors and secure communications.”
The state guarantee was co-proposed by Finance Minister Jan Jambon, who described it as protecting “a strategic investment of a Belgian company.”
A Larger Competition for Congo’s Minerals
The battle over the snail mountain is part of a much larger geopolitical competition for Congo’s mineral wealth. The DRC is responsible for approximately 70% of global cobalt production and is a major exporter of copper, lithium, tin, gold, and tantalum, all crucial for batteries, electric vehicles, and defense technology.
China has deep roots in Congolese mining, with companies like CMOC (China Molybdenum) controlling major mines and having created thousands of local jobs and built infrastructure. The United States has been increasingly assertive in countering Chinese influence, successfully pressuring Congo to block a Chinese takeover of Chemaf Resources in 2025 and brokering agreements between Congo and Rwanda over mineral access.
Belgium’s involvement is deeply rooted in history. Umicore, formerly Union Minière, operated mines in Katanga during the colonial era. The uranium from the Shinkolobwe mine was famously used in the Manhattan Project and the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After Congolese independence in 1960, the mine was sealed, but the historical connection between Belgian industry and Congolese minerals endures.
The Uranium Shadow
The strategic importance of Congo extends beyond germanium. A recent investigation by the New York Times and Lighthouse Reports revealed that 2,000 to 5,000 tons of uranium have been shipped from Congo over the past quarter-century, mostly undeclared, mixed with cobalt hydroxide and mining waste. If enriched, this uranium could make 600 nuclear weapons or power a large nuclear reactor for 10 years.
David Albright, a nuclear weapons expert at the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, warned: “The accumulation of uncontrolled stocks of natural uranium can lead to very dangerous situations.”
This uranium connection adds another layer of strategic significance to Congo’s mineral resources and explains why major powers are competing so intensely for access and influence in the region.
What’s Next
The Belgian state guarantee represents a significant commitment by Brussels to secure critical mineral supply chains for European industry. The partnership between Umicore and STL is expected to expand as the DRC’s germanium production capacity grows.
For the DRC, the deal offers an opportunity to diversify its partnerships and strengthen its position in the global critical minerals market. For Belgium and Europe, it provides a hedge against Chinese export controls and supply chain vulnerabilities.
As the competition for critical minerals intensifies, the snail mountain in Lubumbashi may prove to be a bellwether for how major powers navigate the complex intersection of resource security, geopolitical rivalry, and development in Africa. The question now is whether Belgium’s strategic bet will pay off, and how China and the United States will respond to this European incursion into a domain they have long dominated.