China Prosecutes Classified Personnel for WeChat Leaks

Chinese authorities have prosecuted a classified personnel member at a technology company for criminal responsibility after he repeatedly leaked state secrets through WeChat groups, according to Xinhua News. The case, disclosed through the official “Baomi Guan” (保密观) WeChat account, underscores growing concerns about information security in the digital age.

The individual, identified only by the surname Cao, served as deputy department head at a technology company and had signed a confidentiality agreement as a classified personnel member. He was prosecuted for the crime of intentionally leaking state secrets (故意泄露国家秘密罪) after authorities determined the leaked information could have compromised China’s national defense security and military interests.

Repeated Violations Over Two Years

According to Science and Technology Daily, Cao’s violations occurred on three separate occasions between 2019 and 2020:

• First incident (2019): Cao attended an annual plan coordination meeting for a certain field. In violation of confidentiality regulations, he privately recorded plan content in a notebook, performed so-called “declassification” processing, created a plan schedule table, and sent it to WeChat friends and an enthusiasts’ group in the relevant field.
• Second incident (2019): Cao attended the plan coordination meeting a second time and used the same method to record and create a schedule table, sending it to WeChat groups again.
• Third incident (2020): Cao arranged for his department colleague Hu to attend the coordination meeting, requiring Hu to record the plan and create a schedule table. Cao then sent the schedule table to WeChat friends and enthusiasts’ groups for a third time.

In addition to these documented leaks, Cao also casually discussed classified task information in enthusiasts’ WeChat groups, further compounding the security breach.

Legal Framework and Consequences

Under Article 398 of China’s Criminal Law, which defines the crimes of intentionally and negligently leaking state secrets, state organ personnel who violate the State Secrets Protection Law and intentionally or negligently leak state secrets—where circumstances are serious—face up to three years imprisonment or criminal detention. Where circumstances are especially serious, the penalty ranges from three to seven years. Non-state organ personnel who commit these crimes are subject to the same provisions.

Three Layers of Risk Identified

Chinese authorities analyzing the case identified three compounding risk factors that enabled the repeated violations, as reported by China.com.cn:

1. Vanity and luck-based mindset: Cao treated classified information as capital for sharing and showing off, placing personal vanity above national security and public interests.
2. Perfunctory management: The involved unit had clear meeting confidentiality requirements but failed to implement effective control measures or conduct confidentiality inspections during and after meetings.
3. Group chat dissemination risk: Social group chats, including industry enthusiast groups and interest exchange groups, lack clear confidentiality responsibilities and information review mechanisms, allowing violations to spread quickly.

Broader Pattern of WeChat Security Concerns

The “Baomi Guan” account, which serves as the official WeChat platform of Jincheng Publishing House under the National Administration of State Secrets Protection, has previously disclosed other cases of classified personnel leaking information. In January 2026, it reported on three people at a key military enterprise being recruited by foreign spies, as documented by 1921.org.cn. The account has also covered cases involving classified personnel who failed to report overseas travel, as noted by Lianhe Zaobao.

WeChat leaks have become a significant concern for Chinese authorities, with multiple cases reported where government officials and classified personnel leaked sensitive information through group chats. Common methods include photographing classified documents and sending them via WeChat, discussing classified content in group chats, and sharing classified schedules or plans. The National Administration of State Secrets Protection has repeatedly emphasized the principle that “classified information must not go online; online information must not be classified.”

Recommendations and Forward Look

Authorities have outlined three key recommendations to prevent similar incidents: strengthening confidentiality education for all personnel, implementing full-process management of classified meetings, and standardizing social group chat usage with clear accountability mechanisms. The case serves as a reminder that the convenience of digital communication tools must never override the strict requirements of state secrets protection—a challenge faced by governments worldwide in the digital age.

As Chinese authorities continue to crack down on information leaks through digital platforms, this prosecution signals that leaking state secrets through WeChat carries serious legal consequences, reinforcing the government’s commitment to safeguarding national security in an increasingly connected world.